More Barbs Aimed at 6th Circuit Net Neutrality Ruling

small businesses, and innovators alike will face increased costs, reduced choice, and less competition. It is a lose-lose-lose.” They added, “This ruling upends the fundamental principle that internet service providers should not act as gatekeepers, favoring certain users, content, or services over others." Markey and Wyden said the decision also shows why the U.S. Supreme Court was wrong when it overturned the Chevron doctrine. The opinion “makes basic errors about communications technologies, neatly illustrating why expert regulators, not judges, are best positioned to make complex public policy decisions.” Andrew Schwartzman, senior counsel at the Benton Institute for Broadband & Society, in an email wrote that the opinion “misreads” the 1996 Telecom Act “in finding that broadband internet service is not subject to the regulatory requirements of Title II of the Communications Act.” Among other concerns, “that deprives the FCC of the power to protect national security, insure that competitive broadband suppliers can have access to necessary distribution outlets and endangers wireless access programs for low-income consumers.” The “good news” was in the judges didn’t do, Schwartzman said. The three-judge panel “gave a narrow reading to the impact of the recent Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision overruling the Chevron doctrine,” he said. The court also didn’t “rely on the carriers’ ‘major question doctrine’ arguments, so that the FCC will retain the power to regulate various aspects of broadband service without future Congressional action.” But Seth Cooper, Free State Foundation director-communications policy studies, said the court offered a “straightforward reading” of the Communications Act. The opinion was “refreshing because it shows how traditional tools of statutory interpretation can be used to resolve even seemingly technical questions like the regulatory classification of broadband,” Cooper emailed: “It’s the type of decision that eluded us so long as lower courts were subject to the ‘Chevron doctrine’ and effectively required to rationalize even far-fetched agency interpretations or re-interpretations of supposed ambiguous statutory provisions.”